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Introduction
“It’s an odd thing that one half of mankind is looking for 
salvation in the future and the other half in the past,” ingenious-
ly noted the anti-hero Ulrich, in Musil’s classic novel of fin-de 
siècle Vienna The Men Without Qualities (1953, p. 323). Indeed, 
as Nisbet (1994) argued in his extensive survey of ideas of pro-
gress across history, “No single idea has been more important 
than, perhaps as important as, the idea of progress in Western 
civilization for nearly three thousand years” (p. 5). From Plato’s 
early thesis elaborated in The Laws (346 B.C.) that human soci-
ety evolved through time to more complex forms, to Pinker’s 
controversial Better Angels of our Nature (2011), which sought to 
demonstrate that institutionalized government brought about 
a long ‘pacification process’ of reduction of violence, authors 
have repeatedly speculated on whether we are approaching or 
departing from a utopian “Golden Age.”
Such wide speculations about the past and future of hu-
mankind take particular shapes that are informed by their social 
contexts. From the end of the eighteenth, and increasingly 
from the mid-nineteenth century, ideas about progress became 
intertwined with the many doctrines on evolution available at 
the time. This is the case of social evolutionism’s most promi-
nent author, Herbert Spencer, but also of Sigmund Freud. By 
arguing that Freud was a social evolutionist in a similar vein as 
Spencer, this paper attempts to bridge a gap in both the Freud-
ian and sociological scholarship that seems to have disregarded 
this aspect of his work. Though substantial attention has been 
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given to the impact of evolutionary theories in psychoanalysis, 
especially since Sulloway’s book (1979), these have generally 
focused on Freud’s individual psychology, overlooking its 
impact in his social theories.1 Moreover, this scholarship has 
concentrated on the influence of the theory of recapitulation 
as proposed by Ernst Haeckel (1866, 1873, 1874), despite the 
fact that Freud’s version has a markedly different quality from 
the German zoologist. Freud’s formulations on the matter 
were primarily focused on identifying how individual psychic 
development recapitulates social evolution, whereas Haeckel 
argued instead for a biological analogy between embryonic 
development and the evolution of the animal’s remote ances-
tors. Freud’s sociological version of recapitulation is aligned 
instead with authors such as Herder, Herbart, Comte, and—
foremost—Spencer.
Placing Freudian social thought in a social evolutionary 
tradition along the lines proposed here leads to a necessary 
revision of his work. Traditionally, Freud is placed in a pessi-
mist tradition stemming from Schopenhauer (Bischler, 1939; 
Ellenberger, 1970; Gupta, 1975; Deigh, 1991; Schorske, 1991; 
Gardiner, 1997; Gardner, 1999; Gödde, 2010). By understand-
ing it instead as embedded in doctrines merging evolution and 
progress, one reaches a different conclusion. His pessimism, 
following this analysis, is of a practical rather than metaphysical 
nature. According to this view, it is man’s current constitution 
at this transitory stage of development that leads to the incon-
gruities and conflicts between the individual and the group. 
Evolution would lead to increased adaptation between the 
individual and society that would generate, on the one hand, 
individuals more adapted to living under the constraints of 
civilized society, while, on the other, a society more capable of 
fulfilling the desires of the individual.
The comparative analysis further focuses on understanding 
the relation that the two authors established in regard to the 
problem of causes. This was a topic of central importance for 
the emerging social and psychological sciences in the nine-
teenth century. Since the positivist crusade against teleology, 
authors in these newly formed sciences could not choose but 
to address the problem of causes and its influence on questions 
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about what type of science and methodology was most suited to 
approach phenomena in their disciplines. It is further argued 
that both Spencer and Freud complicated the matter to a great 
extent, by acquiring a perspective that is akin to the positivist 
one but that resorts to teleological notions—a position I here 
called natural teleology.
If, as Bury (1920/2006) argued in his classic The Idea of 
Progress, progress “is a theory which involves a synthesis of the 
past and a prophecy for the future” (p. 2), this is also true of 
the work of the two authors studied more closely in this paper. 
More than an account of the evolution of society, in his Synthetic 
Philosophy (1862–1893), Spencer developed a whole cosmology. 
This paper argues that, with psychoanalysis, Freud had a similar 
conception.2 In both authors, this involved speculation about 
the emergence of life, the descent of man, the evolution of 
civilization and, based on that genetic account, of a “prophecy 
for the future” of humanity. For Spencer and Freud, this proph-
ecy also prescribed an ethical commitment for the individual, 
binding them morally into the future progress of civilization.
Historian Peter Bowler (1983) maintained that the rela-
tionship between social thought and biological theories has 
been marked by the absorption of biological theories into ex-
isting social debates as a form of providing further credibility 
and validity to pre-established ideologies. Because the relation 
between organisms to social formations is too complex to be 
precisely formulated causally, “in each case one aspect of the 
scientific theory was chosen to be stressed,” so that “far from 
inspiring new attitudes, biological ideas were exploited as a 
means of justifying ideological positions that already existed” 
(p. 283). One such prominent example is the linear account 
of evolution, which states that species evolved in a linear path 
from lower to more complex and intelligent organisms. This 
idea, used extensively as a scientific proof of racial superiority 
in the nineteenth century, was in fact popular even before the 
idea of biological evolution first appeared (Burrow, 1966).
The final argument this essay makes is that the “prophecy 
for the future” formulated by both authors is deeply ideolog-
ical. In both cases, but especially with Freud, not only was his 
culture taken as the model towards which all others should 
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aspire, but his own personal dispositions and social role was 
taken as goals towards which all people must strive. Freud’s 
perspective was not only ethnocentric but also self-centric. In 
his account of the progress of humanity, Freud not only made 
use of teleological notions of finality but also placed himself 
and his culture as the exemplars of that ideal.
The Social Sciences and the Problem of Causes
One common aspect to both the social sciences and psy-
chology is their epistemological location at the edge of the two 
traditions classically described as Galilean and Aristotelian. The 
early years in both disciplines in the nineteenth century was 
marked by fierce methodological debates. The contrast is one 
between two distinct views on scientific explanation, and in par-
ticular about two notions of cause. This distinction is commonly 
defined as one between causal versus teleological notions. The 
first type is also called mechanistic, the latter finalistic. One aims 
to predict and explain (Erklären) phenomena, while the latter 
seeks to make facts teleologically or finalistically understanda-
ble (Verstehen). As it is classically understood, the development 
of modern science has been characterized by the progressive 
elimination of final causes from its modes of explanation. While 
von Wright (1971) argued that “the Aristotelian tradition today 
represents merely the fading survival of obsolete elements from 
which science is gradually becoming ‘liberated’” (p. 2), Mayr 
(1992) made the case that biology only moved into the realm 
of the natural sciences through the elimination of teleological 
thinking (1992, 1998).
Teleology presupposes a tendency or purpose towards 
a given endpoint—i.e., the final cause. From the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, such organizational tendencies were 
ascribed to essential natures or forces. A grown oak tree is, 
along those lines, the purpose or final cause of a seed; a seed 
contains within itself life forces that will transform it into a ma-
ture oak. In applying this explanatory framework to organisms, 
deviations from the purpose were read as marks of pathology. If 
organisms do not fulfil their purposes, this happens (following 
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this perspective) due to some form of arrest in their natural 
development.
Such type of thinking led to several incongruities, fore-
most circularity. Molière in The Imaginary Invalid (1673/2004) 
famously mocked the character of the doctor in his play for 
subscribing to such circular arguments: “Why does Opium pro-
duce sleep?,” he is asked. To which he answers: “Because there 
is in it a Virtus dormitive,” i.e., a “dormitive power” (act III, sc. 
iii). Nietzsche (1886/2002), in turn, references Molière’s play 
in order to ridicule Kant and the philosophers of Romanticism 
for similar reasoning:
“How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” Kant 
asked himself, - and what was really his answer? By virtue 
of a faculty [Vermöge eines Vermögens], which is to say: ena-
bled by an ability. Unfortunately, though, not in these few 
words, but rather so laboriously, reverentially, and with 
such an extravagance of German frills and profundity 
that people failed to hear the comical niaiserie allemande 
[German stupidity] in such an answer. […] The honey-
moon of German philosophy had arrived; all the young 
theologians of the Tubingen seminary ran off into the 
bushes—they were all looking for “faculties”. […] There 
had been dreamers: first and foremost - the old Kant. “By 
virtue of a faculty”—he had said, or at least meant. But 
is that really—an answer? An explanation? Or instead 
just a repetition of the question? So how does opium 
cause sleep? “By means of a faculty”, namely, the virtus 
dormitiva—replies the doctor in Molière. (Nietzsche, 
1886/2002, pp. 12–13)
Appealing to essential powers or forces can therefore be poten-
tially misleading and tautological. If opium produces sleep, it 
can indeed be said of it to have “dormitive powers.” However, 
when one asks the question in hand, one is in fact enquiring 
as to the mechanisms by which such an effect is produced. 
These are discovered by understanding the (efficient) causes, 
which entails breaking the phenomena into its elementary 
parts and explaining how these interact so as to produce the 
effect under study.
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Whereas such methodology worked with a large measure 
of success in the inorganic sciences, when applied to vital 
phenomena difficulties were encountered. How can it be said 
that the hand was not made for grasping, that a bird does not 
build a nest for laying eggs, or that a squirrel is not preparing 
for winter? In fact, similar criticism to that of Nietzsche’s can 
be made of mechanical explanations. “Why are there sex dif-
ferences?” one might ask. “Because of hormones,” a mechanist 
would reply. Although true, it cannot be said that the answer 
has addressed the question. When one asks the question in 
hand, as philosopher Robert Brandon (1981) pointed out in 
his essay on teleological explanations, one is asking what are 
there sexual differences for, what is the purpose of it (p. 91).
As for the social sciences, the model established in the 
writings of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill in the 1830s 
and 40s formed an ideal that was extended into the beginning 
of the twentieth century. The aim of both authors for the social 
sciences, in the Course de Philosophie Positive (1830) and the System 
of Logic (1843/1973) respectively, was to eliminate, as much as 
possible, the role of teleological explanations in the discipline 
and thus pave the way for it to become a science (Turner, 2003b, 
2003a). Comte’s most famous contribution, the “Law of the 
Three Stages,” has as its inherent goal the elimination of final 
causes. According to the law, each science moves successfully 
through three stages of development. The “theological stage” 
is marked by an appeal to “fictitious entities”—gods, spirits 
and so on. It is followed by the “metaphysical stage,” where 
explanations called for abstract forces—such as momentum and 
cause. In the final positivity stage, those ideas are eliminated, 
and purely predictive laws formed the whole of what was taken 
to be scientific in each domain.
The law did not speak of “forces” that assured the inevita-
bility of this process. Comte, instead, theorized about the condi-
tions for progress. The positive mind no longer asks why events 
unfold—it ceases to speculate on the hidden nature of things. 
Instead, it describes how phenomena arise and which course 
they take. Newton was taken as the model for this positivity. His 
description of motion and attraction no longer speculated on 
the essence of matter or movement, but simply aimed at de-
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scribing the laws governing these phenomena. Questions about 
the causes of gravitation no longer made sense, for asking such 
questions would invariably involve resorting to metaphysical 
or theological notions. Physics was, however, the only science 
to have, for the most part, arrived at the positivity stage. The 
emerging life sciences, on the other hand, had not yet moved 
that far. Social science was even further from liberation. Comte 
took this as his task.
His English counter-part, John Stuart Mill, discovered in 
Comte’s Course “one of the most profound books ever written 
on the philosophy of the sciences” (Mill, YEAR, as cited in T. 
R. Wright, 1986, p. 41). This influence was particularly clear 
in his A System of Logic (Mill, 1843/1973), where Mill intended 
to oppose the influence exerted at the time by the “German, 
or a priori view of human knowledge,” in particular that of 
Naturphilosophie, with “a text-book of the opposite doctrine—that 
which derives all knowledge from experience, and all moral 
and intellectual qualities principally form the direction given to 
the associations” (Mill, 1873/1969, p. 135). The book aimed at 
demonstrating how universal truths could be discovered solely 
via experience and association. Such an approach, however, 
required the assumption that nature is governed by universal 
laws. Underlying all laws of nature was a single principle, the 
“Law of Causation.” This was nothing but:
The familiar truth that invariability of succession is found 
by observation to obtain the very fact in nature and some 
other fact which has preceded it, independently of all 
considerations respecting the ultimate mode of produc-
tion of phenomena (Mill, 1843/1973, p. 327).
As there are no exceptions to the causal order, this also was 
also the case in humans—both in individuals (psychology) as 
in social formations (sociology).
Mill was, however, aware of the difficulty of the task. Events 
happening to both individuals and groups are at most times 
incapable of being determined causally. This is the case, not 
because they are not governed by causal laws, but due to their 
inherent complexity:
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[The] effects of the separate causes […] are intermingled 
with, and disguised by, the homogenous and closely allied 
effect of other causes […] some of which cancel one 
another, while others do not appear distinguishably, but 
merge in one sum […] there is often an insurmountable 
difficulty in tracing by observation any fixed relation 
whatever. (1843/1973, p. 443)
The solution is thus to resort to statistics, studying many cases 
and thus producing approximate generalizations. As Turner 
(2003a) aptly noted:
[S]ocial science, for Mill, thus resembled the science of 
tides, which can never be reduced to a general theory. Al-
though the main effects are understood, and predictions 
from these main effects are both possible and valuable, 
they are nevertheless subject to local causes of diverse 
kinds. (2003a, p. 64)
The method proposed by Comte and Mill became a divisive 
one within the discipline, but one that could not be simply 
neglected—and authors in the social sciences after them could 
be placed in a spectrum in relation to two extremes: the positiv-
ist causal view of the two authors at one end, and teleological 
understanding at the other. Along this spectrum, authors such 
as Marx and Hegel, whose emphasis in discovering single-factor 
laws of historical progress aim to make phenomena teleologi-
cally intelligible rather than predictable through knowledge 
of the efficient causes, would occupy the other end of the 
spectrum. Weber occupies a moderate teleological position, 
and Durkheim a moderate causal one. It is more difficult to 
classify Spencer. He assumed both views, so his perspective can 
be said to be ambiguous. While subscribing to the universality 
of natural law and explicitly rejecting teleology, he also believed 
that these laws revealed a purpose in nature.
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Spencer: Organic analogy and the teleological law of 
progress
Spencer’s approach to determinism in his Synthetic Philoso-
phy (1862–1893) looks at first similar to that of Comte and Mill. 
He sought to show that there are no exceptions to scientific 
explanations, in the form of natural laws, for all phenomena 
in the universe. Implicit in his project, however, was the goal 
of demonstrating that a thorough explanation of the laws 
guiding the universe—from the inorganic to the organic and 
including the mind and the social world—would reveal that 
these phenomena lead inexorably to progress. This reveals a 
debt of a different nature, in particular to philosophers of the 
Naturphilosophie: “Widely different as they are from my own, 
they are conceptions of the same class, and may very possibly 
have had some suggestive influences” (Spencer, 1904, p. 489).3 
Thus, in similar approach to the positivist authors, Spencer 
believed in a law-based universe. Contrary to them, and from 
a perspective akin to teleology, the lawful universe was vested 
with value and meaning.
This second aspect might have been a direct influence 
from his father, George Spencer, who advocated a form of evo-
lutionary deism that Thomas Mozley, a member of the Chapman 
Circle of which Herbert was also a participant, argued was the 
direct ancestor of the Synthetic Philosophy (1862–1893). Evolu-
tionary deists saw God’s providence as operating in the form of 
natural laws, with the purpose of engendering progress through 
natural development. Because these laws were believed to be 
initially set by God—or rather by the “GREAT FIRST CAUSE” 
(sic), as Erasmus Darwin, another evolutionary deist, preferred 
to call it —they should lead to maximum happiness (Taylor, 
2007, pp. 38–42). Herbert Spencer explicitly rejected any appeal 
to teleological explanations, but one can easily identify in his 
description of nature’s striving for perfection elements that 
would, in Comte’s terms, belong to the metaphysical rather 
than the positivist stage. As Turner argued, “His discussions of 
the law have little to do with the incidence of conditions,” as 
was the case with Comte, “and much to do with ‘general laws 
of force’” (Turner, 2003a, p. 66). Spencer tended to see social 
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stages as the fulfilment of a pre-existing disposition, which if 
not explicitly, is tacitly teleological.
Natural law was, for Spencer, the law of evolution. He saw it 
everywhere, from the development of the earth, to life, society, 
morals, commerce and language. In its most simple form the law 
stated that “All things are growing or decaying, accumulating 
matter or wearing away, integrating or disintegrating” (1897, 
p. 292). The fragment, however, conceals the arrow of nature: 
progress. This, for him—and borrowing the notion from Ger-
man embryologist Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1876)—consisted 
in the passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, 
from the simple to the complex. Moreover, for Spencer, though 
regression and dissolution into simpler forms occurs under 
special circumstances, evolution, heterogeneity, complexity and 
progress are the rule rather than the exception in the grand 
scheme of things.
The reasoning behind it was rather simple and was explored 
in his essay on progress: if “every cause produces more than one 
effect,” then “each kind of progress is from the homogeneous to 
the heterogeneous, and this is because each change is followed 
by several changes” (Spencer, 1857, p. 466; emphasis added). 
Progress and evolution thus refer to increasing heterogeneity. 
Spencer saw it in the formation of the universe (from singular-
ity to plurality), of the solar system (an organized hierarchical 
system consisting of a star, planets and satellites), the surface 
of the earth (changing from a mass of matter of homogeneous 
consistency and temperature, to the heterogeneity of the envi-
ronments found today), in the development of early forms of 
life which progress into increasingly heterogeneous flora and 
fauna, in man (“the most heterogeneous of animals,” given the 
variety of races), societies (from aggregates of homogeneous 
individuals to heterogeneity in forms of authority), all the way 
to the subdivision in labour in industry, language and the arts.
The transition from the study of organic structures to the 
social sphere was accomplished via the organic analogy. In the 
second part of his Principles of Sociology (1885), Spencer outlined 
four points of analogy between organic and social aggregates, 
again aiming at demonstrating that both are phenomena reg-
ulated by the same law of increasing heterogeneity and indi-
115Leonardo Niro Nascimento
viduation. First, he said, (1) they both “exhibit augmentation 
in mass,” i.e., they grow. The increase in size is supplemented 
by (2) the development of structure. The progressive differ-
entiation of structures is accompanied by (3) the “progressive 
differentiation of function,” i.e., heterogeneity. This differen-
tiation gives rise to (4) the mutual dependency of parts. This 
is the ‘fundamental trait’ through which “a social organism 
and an individual organism are entirely alike.” Because of the 
differentiation of functions, in both cases the aggregate exceeds 
its elemental units.
Progress, therefore, “is not an accident, not a thing within 
human control, but a beneficent necessity” (Spencer, 1857, p. 
484). Civilization being part of nature, its modifications result 
from the law of evolution, and the
[M]odifications mankind have undergone, and are still 
undergoing, result from a law underlying the whole or-
ganic creation; and provided the human race continues, 
and the constitution of things remains the same, those 
modifications must end in completeness.
 The law of evolution has therefore a normative, moral finality: 
“As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands alone, and 
slender if one of a group [. . .] so surely must things be called 
evil and immoral disappear; so surely must man become per-
fect” (Spencer, 1901, p. 156). For Spencer, therefore, not only 
are the laws of morality natural laws—nature itself is moral. It 
thus follows that the study of the nature of social formations 
has ethical consequences.
Concerning the ethical implications of the natural law, his 
message was one of radical laissez-faire. Real and long-standing 
progress was only brought about through evolution, which 
operates beyond the human control. Following this spirit of 
radical liberalism, the force that drove progress and social 
transformation was adaptation. Trying to mould evolution 
through mechanisms of social control (such as welfare) could 
only disturb the evolutionary process of adaptation between 
the individual and its environment. Individuals needed to be-
come habituated to the demands of living in a social state, by 
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developing the good habits required for new forms of social 
formation and eliminating those that ceased to be adaptive. 
As a believer in use-inheritance, Spencer saw it as the duty of 
each generation—understood as of each individual in that 
generation—to maximize adaptation in order to transmit the 
qualities needed for posterity, thus gradually building the path 
for perfection.
In a perfect state, the individual would instinctively respect 
the rights of others and refrain from any action that would 
cause pain. This ideal individual would behave with instinc-
tive altruism, acting to give pleasure to others and deriving 
pleasure from the process. Spencer found the model of such 
dynamic in that of the mother feeding her child, an activity 
from which—in his view—both parties derive pleasure. In Social 
Statics (Spencer, 1851), he warned his readers that reaching 
perfect adaptation would take infinite time, but allowed for 
the state of equilibrium of the individual to the environment 
to become progressively approximate to the ideal. More than 
that, evolution in fact provided the ideal moral standard that 
individuals should strive to attain.
With the law of nature, Spencer was providing a guarantee 
for ideologies widely shared in Victorian society. He regarded 
Britain and America as the nations most closely representing 
the liberal ideal of his system. Although he personally despised 
colonialism and was a public denouncer of its atrocities (Fran-
cis, 2007, p. 283f.), his linear account of the development of 
societies, based on a deeper law of evolution that included 
all phenomena in the universe, was particularly useful for 
defending colonial practices in the expanding British empire. 
This helped make Spencer the most celebrated and revered 
philosopher of his time in Britain, the impact of his ideas ex-
tending widely to authors in Europe and America (Jones and 
Peel, 2004; Francis and Taylor, 2014).
Freud: From the Organic to the Libidinal Analogy
The linear understanding of the evolutionary process was 
central to most social evolutionist theory in the nineteenth 
century. As Bowler (1983) argued:
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[D]espite Darwin’s emphasis that development is a 
branching rather than a linear process, the vast majority 
of his followers continued to believe that evolution of 
man consisted of a single line of ascent from the apes. 
The idea that the “lower” races might represent inter-
mediate stages in the chain of being linking the apes 
to man had been developed in the eighteenth century 
and was still popular in the early nineteenth century. 
(1983, p. 302).
This was true of the most eminent proponent of social evolu-
tionism, Herbert Spencer, but also of Sigmund Freud.
Social evolution for Freud takes a linear form, following 
a pre-existing disposition. Throughout his writings on the 
genesis and development of groups and cultures, from Totem 
and Taboo (1913) to his last book, Moses and Monotheism (1939), 
he described the development from the state of nature to civ-
ilization as occurring by a progression of stages shared by all 
cultures. In brief, his account of the descent of men begins 
with (1) the human hordes, with men in a Hobbesian state of 
nature. In this mythical period, the individual lived in a state 
of complete narcissistic omnipotence, solely regulated by the 
pleasure principle, i.e., with no restriction of instincts, but at 
the same time in complete dependence on others, and with 
feelings of total helplessness against the oppressive forces of 
nature (Freud, 1930, p. 123)—which drove these proto-peo-
ple, who would otherwise live in solitude, to gather in groups. 
The “tyrannical father,” i.e., the strongest and most powerful 
male leader of the horde, had the monopoly of women in the 
group, but at some point in pre-historic time he was killed and 
devoured by his oppressed children, thus generating guilt and 
the development of the first social contract (1913, 1939, pp. 
82–83). This act inaugurated the (2) totemic societies (in fact, it 
could be said that this act inaugurates culture itself), marked by 
the establishment of animal gods representing the dead father 
and by women occupying the positions of power.
The next step (3) in the development of civilization was 
the humanization of the forces of nature in pantheism (Freud, 
1913, 1939, p. 83). With this stage, a deeper mastering of reality 
was gained. Since the forces of nature now behaved in a way 
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similar to ours, we were able to comprehend it. Nature ceased 
to be so terribly frightening and became more familiar (Freud, 
1927, pp. 14–15). This stage is followed by the appearance of 
(4) monotheism. The polytheistic gods progressively withdrew 
from nature, and “morality becomes their true domain” (1927, 
p. 18). Now the gods served two purposes: they defended men 
‘against the dangers of nature and Fate, and against the inju-
ries that threaten him from human society itself’. At last, all 
gods were condensed in one, and monotheism was instituted 
(1927, p. 19). The primal Father, who was always present in the 
civilization’s unconscious, was returned. There is one last step 
in this process, usually neglected by Freudian scholars, (5) the 
establishment of a rational society, based on the scientific Weltan-
schauung. There is no further stage, for “there is no appeal to 
a court above that of reason” (1927, p. 26). Reason is thus the 
final aim of civilization. Freud contended that the transition to 
the last stage had just started, and the process is expected to 
be long, but “in this process there is no stopping; the greater 
the number of men to whom the treasures of knowledge be-
come accessible, the more widespread is the falling-away from 
religious belief” (1927, p. 38).
The parallel to Comte’s stages is fairly evident. By taking 
into account that Comte broke down the theological stage into 
three sub-stages—animism, polytheism and monotheism—the 
similarity is even more striking. Thus, there are almost direct 
parallels between Comte’s animism and Freud’s totemic stages, 
between the first’s polytheism and the latter’s pantheism, and 
so on, all the way down to the positivity stage—the main dis-
similarities being that Comte did not provide for an initial state 
of nature in the same way as Freud, and that Freud merged 
the monotheistic and metaphysical stages into one. This anal-
ogy has been curiously overlooked by most of the literature. 
Philip Rieff (1959) is one of the few authors to have stressed 
the impact of Comte’s positivism in Freud’s social theories, in 
particular where he argued—against Sulloway and others who 
claimed that the impact of evolutionism in Freud was primarily 
effected via Ernst Haeckel’s version of recapitulation—that
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Freud did not much employ this [i.e., Haeckel’s] bio-
logical version of analogy between individual and racial 
development […]. A more nearly sociological version, 
familiar through the variety of uses to which it was put by 
Herder, Herbart, Comte, and Spencer, is the one more 
often employed. (Rieff, 1959, p. 188)
Nevertheless, he said nothing there about the specific set and 
order of stages, which is similar only in the cases of Comte and 
Freud. The only other author who has touched on the analogies 
between the schemes as presented here seems to have been 
Jean Laplanche. In his Court traité de l’inconscient, after discussing 
Comte’s stages, Laplanche argued that “Freud in turn endors-
es a succession [of stages of civilization] which is not very far 
from [Comte’s], despite somewhat different terms: animistic, 
religious, scientific worldview” (Laplanche, 1993, p. 94).
Despite the similarities between the two systems, one strik-
ing difference distinguishes them. Whereas Comte theorized the 
conditions for progress, Freud instead affirmed its inevitability. 
While for the former progress is not necessary and certain, 
but a consequence of particular states of affairs being fulfilled 
in determinate groups, Freud instead understood progress as 
an inexorable process in any civilization, driven by the force 
of evolution. By understanding progress as inevitable and as 
a consequence of the law of evolution, Freud is aligned with 
Spencer’s position that I have here called natural teleology.4
In that sense, Freud followed his contemporaries by equat-
ing evolution and progress. The novelty introduced by social 
evolutionists was to apply this moralizing view of the evolution-
ary process to the understanding of groups. From the moral 
character—that societies are more or less developed—followed 
a normative one. The more developed societies were taken 
as models to which the others should strive. For Freud, West-
ern culture was the point of reference from which “primitive 
societies,” not usually distinguished from one another, were 
measured. Throughout his work, “savages” were often compared 
to children (1913, p. 62; 1920, p. 117), while intellectualized 
Westerners of the upper classes were treated as adults. The 
Western civilization, being more developed than the others, 
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had merely shown the path that all other cultures would take 
independently of the western civilization’s existence itself. 
Evolution is a single road, and Western civilization was ahead 
only because it travelled along this path earlier than others.
In Freud’s social evolutionist framework, not only were 
there more and less developed societies, but there were also 
more and less developed social classes. The “masses,” said Freud, 
“are lazy and unintelligent; they have no love for instinctual 
renunciation” (1927, p. 7). James Strachey, Freud’s translator, 
who normally translated the German Masse as “Groups,” in this 
instance kept the denigrating tone of the original. Individuals 
inside a determinate social class were also deemed more or 
less developed. The figure of the intellectual, taken by Freud 
as the ideal example of a “minority” that achieved “higher 
cultural aims” (1908, p. 193) through sublimation, achieved 
the highest standards in civilization, and was therefore taken 
as the role model to which all other individuals should ideally 
adapt in order to build a more fulfilling society. Thus, Freud 
not only took his culture as the model for all others, but he 
also ascribed to his social role and personal predisposition the 
goals towards which all people within his culture should aspire.
Each stage marked a new form of mastering of reality, a 
new mode of defense against nature, for this is the main task 
of civilization (1927, p. 15). The stages have not been arbi-
trarily chosen—the civilizatory stages, says Freud, mirror the 
psychosexual stages of libidinal development. Whereas Spencer 
used an organic analogy between the individual and the social, 
Freud made use instead of what could be called a libidinal 
analogy. By comparing the psychological development of the 
individual—from autoeroticism to the post-oedipal adult—to 
the evolution of civilization from state of nature to a rational 
society, it becomes possible for him to sketchily map the stages 
of development in individual and group psychology. One prom-
inent example is found where he argued that “[monotheistic] 
religion would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of 
humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose 
out of the Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father” 
(1927, p. 43). Freud was not referring to pathological obses-
sional neurosis in adults, but to a hypothetical neurotic phase 
in normal development, which is spontaneously overcome in 
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the course of development. That is, monotheism indicates a 
particular stage in the development of civilization which, in the 
individual, takes place at about the oedipal period.
This was also the kernel of Freud’s criticism of religion. In 
the same way that this infantile neurosis must be overcome at the 
individual level, it must also be surpassed in the social sphere. 
Humanity must reach maturity, and maturity entails replacing 
neurotic phantasies with reality-tested secondary-process:
Those historical residues have helped us to view religious 
teachings, as it were, as neurotic relics, and we may now 
argue that the time has probably come, as it does in an 
analytic treatment, for replacing the effects of repression 
by the results of the rational operation of the intellect. 
(Freud, 1927, p. 44)
Freud mainly pursued this line of thinking in his writings of 
the 1910s’s whilst in active correspondence with the Hungarian 
psychoanalyst Sandor Ferenczi—Totem and Taboo from 1913 
being an exemplary publication of that period. However, no-
where has Freud taken this speculative enterprise so far as in his 
“phylogenetic phantasy,” i.e., his unfinished and posthumously 
published metapsychological paper on the transference neuro-
ses (Freud, 1915/1987). There, and in particular in its second 
part, Freud attempted to trace direct correlations between three 
levels of evolution and regression: that of society according to 
the stages, that of libidinal development in the individual, and 
of regression in different types of psychopathology. If the evolu-
tion of the individual recapitulates the evolution of civilization, 
and psychopathology represents a psychic regression to some 
stage of development in the individual, Freud hypothesizes 
there that “it is legitimate to assume that the neuroses must 
also bear witness to the history of the mental development of 
mankind” (1915/1987, p. 11). He goes as far as to hypothesize 
that the disposition to hysteria and compulsion must present 
regressions to a stage of development that occurred during 
the Ice Age (p. 13). 
Freud never managed to complete this analogical mapping. 
He would return to this project from time to time, but with 
less emphasis on completing the task as he became increasingly 
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more aware that this laid beyond his means. In Civilization and 
its Discontents, he seemed to pass on the torch to one of his 
readers, where he says that “it would be a tempting task for 
anyone who has a knowledge of human civilizations to follow 
out this analogy in detail” (Freud, 1930, p. 140).
Progress and the Ethics of Psychoanalysis
This process of social evolution, according to Freud, hap-
pens at a cost: “The price we pay for our advance in civilization 
is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of 
guilt” (Freud, 1930, p. 135). For every new civilizatory stage, 
a toll must be paid in the form of instinctual repression. All 
those accumulated repressions, the base of our civilization, are 
still present and active in every individual, who resents them: 
“We have found to our surprise that these privations are still 
operative and still form the kernel of hostility to civilization” 
(Freud, 1927, p. 10). The individual is therefore ambivalent in 
relation to civilization. He is at the same time its enemy and 
guardian, because although the end of civilization might bring 
him unrestrained pleasure, it would also signify the return of 
the tyrannical father:
[A]nd so in reality only one person could be made un-
restrictedly happy by such a removal of the restrictions 
of civilization, and he would be a tyrant, a dictator, who 
had seized all the means to power [...] how ungrateful, 
how short-sighted after all, to strive for the abolition of 
civilization! (1927, p. 15).
Because Freud placed the conflict between the individual and 
society at the core of the human condition, the scholarly work 
on Freud has classically placed his social theories in a pessimistic 
tradition stemming from Schopenhauer. This reading, however, 
overlooks the evolutionary aspect of his work highlighted here. 
Unlike Schopenhauer, Freud’s pessimism does not translate 
into nihilism. Following from his linear understanding of so-
cial evolution, it is expected that at the last stage of evolution 
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(scientific Weltanschauung), in a society where individuals are 
regulated solely by the reality principle, conflict between the 
individual and the social environment would cease or at least 
greatly diminish.
Not even the advent of the death drive in 1920 seems 
to have changed that drastically his belief in progress, as sev-
en years after the publication of Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920)—where the concept was first consistently articulated—he 
still proclaimed in Future of an Illusion (1927) that “the primacy 
of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant, distant future, but 
probably not in an infinitely distant one” (p. 51), an argument 
he would again repeat in similar form in the New Introductory 
Lectures (1933a, p. 171). In-between the “optimism” of these 
two works, however, stands the grimmer picture depicted in 
Civilization and its Discontents (1930). This has puzzled scholars, 
who have at times argued that Freud held two competing and 
incongruous social theories: the first, a classic utilitarian view 
held until the late 1920s; the latter, the pessimism from Civi-
lization and its Discontents (1930) onwards, where the concept 
of the death drive is properly articulated in his social theory 
(Deigh, 1991).
This reading, I believe, falls apart upon closer inspection. 
Firstly because, as mentioned, the supposed “shift” has not 
occurred after Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) as one might 
expect. Future of an Illusion (1927) was written seven years after 
that essay, and at a time when Freud was most preoccupied with 
thinking the repercussions of the death drive. A counterargu-
ment could be made that Freud did not become fully aware of 
the social implications of the death drive until 1930. However, 
the view portrayed in the New Introductory Lectures, from 1933, 
offers a decisive rebuttal to that. Finally, by following this anal-
ysis, one would be forced to argue that Civilization stands at a 
unique position is his work.
Another interpretation is possible and would avoid this 
awkward schism in his work. The difference between Future 
and Civilization, along those lines, is rather one of historical 
perspective. In Future and New Lectures, where Freud is primarily 
concerned with offering a treatment of the natural history of 
our species, his stance takes a more optimistic tone since the 
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timeframe of his analysis stretches infinitely into the future. In 
Civilization, on the other hand, he is directly addressing current 
events leading to another world war. In not having the benefit 
of infinite time, his analysis takes a more cautionary tone. When 
analysing human evolution through the point of view of natural 
history, it becomes possible for him to envisage a future where 
civilization would produce little or no harm to the individual. 
The problem laid for Freud with our present constitution, i.e., 
the fact we are at the same time rational and irrational, social 
and narcissistic. Evolution would bring more adapted beings in 
the future, together with other forms of social organisation that 
would be more fulfilling for the individuals living in them. In 
the short-term, however, our current constitution might bring 
momentary regressions in this inexorable process.
As Joshua Dienstag (2006) argued in his book tracing the 
philosophical tradition of pessimism, Freud’s pessimism is of 
a practical and not metaphysical nature. There, he noted that
[… I]n repeatedly identifying the pleasure principle with 
infancy and animality, Freud means to encourage our 
efforts to replace it more fully with the reality principle. 
To accept the limitations of our time-bound conditions 
is for Freud the mark of emotional and intellectual ma-
turity; to resist them is childish. Where Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy [...] teaches us to leave this world behind 
to the greatest extent possible, Freud’s psychotherapy 
attempts to give us the tools with which to engage it. 
(2006, p. 101)
For Freud, our individual actions are effective and do have 
the power to produce a positive change in the world, or the 
practice of psychoanalysis itself would be vain. It is interesting 
to note that, as was the case with Spencer, Freud placed the 
burden of social progress onto the individual rather than on 
mechanisms of social change. The latter should follow as a 
consequence of the former, not the other way around. Richard 
Sterba (1978) showed this in greater clarity in a paper where 
he described discussions that took place in the early Wednesday 
Group meetings at Freud’s house in Vienna, of which he was 
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a participant. In one of the meetings, Wilhem Reich gave a 
passionate presentation of how some recent social experiments 
taking place in post-revolutionary Russia would—according 
to him—free humankind of neurotic suffering. Freud was ex-
tremely sceptical of this argument and, according to Sterba, his 
criticism was one of the reasons that led Reich to break with 
the group (Sterba, 1978).
Social change, for Freud, could therefore be achieved only 
via the development of the individual, by helping them over-
come their neuroses that are characteristic of this transitional 
(although potentially endless) stage between monotheism and 
the establishment of a scientific Weltanschauung. One should 
also not overlook the fact that Freud was a strong believer in 
Lamarckian use-inheritance (Sulloway, 1979; Ritvo, 1990; Young, 
2006). Therefore, each individual achieving greater maturity 
meant a further step in the process of development of society 
as a whole. Psychoanalysis, in this sense, could be seen as con-
stituting an ethical project, aimed at the progress of society, one 
individual at a time. Freud articulated this clearly at least once:
I should therefore like to let you go with an assurance 
that in treating your patients psycho-analytically you are 
doing your duty in more senses than one. You are not 
merely working in the service of science, by making use of 
the one and only opportunity for discovering the secrets 
of the neuroses; you are not only giving your patients 
the most efficacious remedy for their sufferings that is 
available to-day; you are contributing your share to the 
enlightenment of the community from which we expect 
to achieve the most radical prophylaxis against neurotic 
disorders along the indirect path of social authority. 
(Freud, 1910, p. 151)
With psychoanalysis, Freud provided his readers with both a 
framework to understand themselves and their personal devel-
opment, as well as with a technique with which to achieve the 
psychic maturity required for social progress. This technique 
consisted not only of the process of analysis “on the couch” 
itself but, above all, of the tools for self-analysis presented in 
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clinical case materials and especially in the Interpretation of 
Dreams (1899). With his dream book and case studies, Freud 
presented his readers with a manual on how to conduct a 
self-analysis (Forrester, 2006, 2013), thus developing themselves, 
and society with them.5 “Ethics,” as Freud pointed out in Civili-
zation, “is thus to be regarded as a therapeutic attempt—as an 
endeavour to achieve, by means of a command of the super-ego, 
something which has so far not been achieved by means of any 
other cultural activities” (1930, p. 142). Ethics is therefore a 
therapeutic action, and therapy is an ethical activity.
Conclusion
As Taylor summarized in his recent book on Spencer:
[T]he synthetic philosophy held two very different world-
views in an uneasy balance. One of these was positivism, 
the notion that the universe could only be explained by 
natural laws, and that there was a radical separation of 
fact and value. […] At the same time, however, Spencer 
also made use of a normative concept of nature (he 
almost always spelled it with a capital letter) as not mere-
ly a physical order, but also a moral one. As such, his 
philosophy was implicitly, if not explicitly, founded on a 
rejection of the fact-value distinction that was central to 
the scientific positivist account of the universe. (Taylor, 
2007, pp. 7–8)
This was the case, it was argued, because of his teleological 
understanding of the natural law. It was further argued that 
Freud had a similar conception. Both authors can be seen as 
subscribing to a position I here called natural teleology. Where 
Spencer based his organic analogy on elements of the sciences 
of his time, in order to validate the ideology embedded in his 
social theories, Freud relied instead in his metapsychology of 
drives and libidinal energy to provide a libidinal analogy.
Drives are abstract elemental parts of human motivation, 
and therefore concepts belonging in principle to what the 
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philosopher Wilfrid Sellars called the scientific image of man (Sel-
lars, 1963). In that image, man is seen as an object, composed 
of elementary parts (neurons, cells, and so on) that interact 
causally so as to construct who we are. This contrasts with the 
manifest image, where explanations are based on personal inten-
tions, beliefs and desires. In the manifest image, teleology and 
intentionality play a major role in explaining action. The best 
explanation for the action of a man drinking water is, along 
these lines, not mechanisms regulating homeostasis, but simply 
thirst—that is, his wish or desire for water.
As elementary parts of personhood, drives should be as-
cribed to the scientific image. Freud however let teleology creep 
into metapsychology. In Instincts and their Vicissitudes, he gave 
us his classic description of drives, along with their four main 
features. Particular focus is given there to their aim: satisfaction 
(Freud, 1915, p. 121). If drives have aims, they exhibit teleolo-
gy. Drives behaving teleologically, it follows that a social theory 
from an analogy with them would also exhibit that feature. This 
leads Freud to appeal to explanations of social phenomena 
that are very much aligned with those defended by the doctor 
in Molière. “Why war?,” Einstein asked Freud in their famous 
letter exchange (Freud, 1933b). “Because of the death drive”—
that is, due to a force of aggression—is essentially what Freud 
answered. One is thus entitled to repeat Nietzsche’s rebuttal: 
“But is that really—an answer? An explanation? Or instead just 
a repetition of the question?”
Notes
1. See also Ritvo (1990) and Young (2006).
2. It is important to note, however, that I am not here making specific claims 
regarding the filiation of ideas. It is hard to evaluate with any level of precision 
how familiar Freud was with Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy (1862–1893). None of 
his works are available in Freud’s personal library in London (Trosman & Sim-
mons 1973) but it is possible that these were left behind during his emigration 
from Vienna, as he did quote Spencer in three of his writings (Freud, 1900, p. 
1, 1905, pp. 145–6, 1913, p. 74). Freud’s contact with Spencer might have been 
indirectly transmitted, via his reading of the English neurologist John Hughlings 
Jackson, who applied Spencerian ideas of evolution to the understanding of brain 
hierarchies (Hughlings Jackson, 1884; York and Steinberg, 2002; Franz and Gil-
lett, 2011; Niro Nascimento, 2017).
3. Although Spencer seemed to be at least familiar with the works of Hegel and 
Schelling, Naturphilosophie might have impacted him more directly via the writings 
of Lorenz Oken, a follower of Schelling who, in his “Physiophilosophie” from 1810, 
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interpreted nature as self-developing towards increasing levels of organisation and, 
in a way very much like Spencer, made extensive use of analogy between findings 
of different sciences—from astronomy to psychology—in order to demonstrate 
his theories (Taylor, 2007, p. 45).
4. Natural teleology bears some resemblance to what Timothy Lenoir called ‘tele-
omechanism,’ and may be considered an offshoot of it, or least greatly impacted 
by it. ‘The teleomechanism research programme,’ according to Lenoir, consisted 
of a series of physiologists in mid-19th century Germany who argued that the life 
sciences must ultimately rest on an explanatory framework uniting the principles 
of both teleology and mechanism (Lenoir, 1981, 1982). The main similarities 
between teleomechanism and natural teleology are therefore the confluence of 
mechanism and teleology, but also that both groups had a concept of force driving 
matter according to aims. However, while the driving force in natural teleology 
is evolution, in teleomechanism it was some concept of vital force (Lebenskraft). 
Moreover, the notion of teleomechanism is used to name a defined set of scientists 
working in the Germany, while the notion of natural teleology is looser than that 
and is primarily related to filiation to this set of ideas. It is also worth noting that 
Karl Ernst Baer, the main author studied by Lenoir as part of teleomechanism 
(Lenoir, 1988), was the prime influence behind Spencer’s (and Haeckel’s) notion 
that evolution moves from homogeneity to heterogeneity—which indicates an 
influence.
5. The execution of this ethical project can also be observed in the formation of 
the psychoanalytic policlinics, in which, as Elizabeth Danto demonstrated in 
her Freud’s Free Clinics, Freud and many of the early psychoanalysts were heavily 
involved in the period after the First World War (Danto, 2005). Their fervour 
for treating the poor can be understood not only as a means to provide more 
humane treatment to those without access to private therapy, but also as a mis-
sionary work of converting more people into psychoanalysis—and thus into social 
development.
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